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This paper, based on participant research amongst folk revivalists, interviews with
cultural managers, and extensive archival research, discusses the táncház (dance
house) folk revival movement as the actualization of interwar efforts of “folk na-
tional cultivation” in Hungary. By putting the dance house in relationship with inter-
war folk critiques, the paper illustrates both continuities and discontinuities between
them, most notably in conceptualizations of the relationship between the ethical or
political roles of such critiques and of the folk itself. The paper argues that folk cri-
tiques, now and then, can play an important role in state formation by reproducing
the folk and acting to secure its citizenship. Nevertheless, how the folk is defined is
historically determined, as is the kind of citizenship entailed. Since folk national
cultivation is premised on the idea that Hungarianness is produced through engage-
ment with the folk and its traditions, the historical approach of this paper
problematizes this process.
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In 1939, just as Hungary began, with the help of Germany, to annex a chunk of
the neighboring territory forfeited nearly twenty years before at the end of World
War I, István Györffy, “the father of Hungarian ethnography,” published a pam-
phlet originally written in 1938 as a memo to the Ministry of Religion and Educa-
tion entitled Folk Tradition and National Cultivation (A néphagyomány és a
nemzeti mûvelõdés). The text prescribes a program for Folk National Cultivation
(Népi-Nemzeti Mûvelõdés), suggesting ways in which the cultural patrimony of
the folk, the oppressed agrarian classes who made up two thirds of the population
and who in Györffy’s understanding made up the most Hungarian stratum of soci-
ety, can be made that of all Hungarian citizens through the incorporation of folk
(népi) culture into everyday life.1
This was not the first (or the last) time that Hungarian intellectuals would pur-
sue such projects with the aim of cultivating Hungarianness. The nation-state as-
pirations of a Hungary subsumed within the Habsburg Empire had encouraged
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magyarization (Hungarianization) policies, especially in the period after the Com-
promise of 1868, which resulted in the establishment of the Dual Monarchy. Such
policies cajoled and coerced the multiethnic population of Hungary to “become
Hungarian” by assimilating to the linguistic nation, or “sprachsnation” (Kann and
David 1984). This language-based production of Hungarianness was influenced
by the Romantic thought of Johann Gottfried Herder, who, countering the enlight-
enment idea that language is a tool for communication and thought, argued that
national languages are historically produced treasuries of thoughts specific to any
given nation and as such are “both representative of and constitutive of the
volksgeist” (Taylor 2006; see also Burger 2003).2
Györffy’s plan synthesizes many of the ideas espoused by folk oriented pro-
jects acting in the rich and complex sphere of Hungarian civil society in the inter-
war period. In a twist of the earlier romanticism surrounding language, compos-
ers-ethnomusicologists Béla Bartók and Zoltán Kodály advocated that musicians
master folk music as a “mother tongue.” In one example Bartók wrote,
in this case, the composer has completely absorbed the idiom of peas-
ant music, which has become his mother tongue. He masters it as
completely as a poet masters his mother tongue (Bartók 1976,
343–344).
Drawing on this idea, Györffy writes in his pamphlet that Hungarian folk song is
the other expressive form of the Hungarian language (1993, 24). Folk music here
takes on the significance and cultivating power that language had had in the pe-
riod mentioned above, and Györffy suggests that it needs the protection and care
afforded to the language itself.
In the interwar period a group of népi, or so-called “populist,” writers pro-
moted similar practices of folk cultivation, inspiring a much broader “népi move-
ment” that enacted the idea in myriad ways.3 This body of people and projects oc-
cupied with the folk, folk culture, and the nation was heterogeneous and bound-
aries between groups were porous. “Village visiting” (so-called falujárás) repre-
sented a central activity intended to promote familiarity with folk practices and
the village way of life and empathy for the villagers themselves. Populist writers
and their followers debated amongst themselves over whether to remain a spiri-
tual/intellectual movement, or whether to enter politics proper. Many saw it as
their responsibility to bring the spirit of the movement to “every social and politi-
cal frame” (Borbándi 1989, 255–256).
While Eric Hirsch (1997) has used the term “folk nationalist” to describe all
those in the interwar period who were preoccupied with the folk, in truth succes-
sive interwar movements recognized populists both as a threat and a potential
source of legitimacy. Government and populist interests converged in some folk
oriented activities, especially in the late 1930s and during the war, reflecting both
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populist commitment to permeate the entire political spectrum and government
efforts to harness their intellectual influence. While ideological and practical ten-
sions abounded, the extent to which the government adopted the language of folk
national cultivation is reflected in the following. In 1940, while praising the Bou-
quet of Pearls folk dance movement, Prime Minister Pál Teleki was quoted as
saying
I have approached my allies… our greatest task is that we keep the
Hungarian spirit (lelki) in this nation, that we teach it to think in Hun-
garian. Not to wander the world as a beggar (koldus), but rather to go
on its own legs, to speak Hungarian, to sing in Hungarian, to dance in
Hungarian. Because one who does that, also thinks in Hungarian
(Teleki in Pálfi 1970, 124).
Despite the obvious emphasis on practice, it is notable that Teleki did not use the
term nép here, using nation instead. One notable convergence of populist and gov-
ernment aims was their shared concern for the ethnic Hungarians living across the
borders set in 1920. Not needing to explain further, Györffy simply writes, “the
protection of folk tradition is most important in the occupied territories” (1993,
52).
In this paper I approach the text of Györffy’s pamphlet as both a theory of col-
lective memory and a plan for its reproduction. Asserting that the seed of Hun-
garianness does not lie in one’s genealogy or name, he wrote, “Hungarianness is
not a question of the body, the blood, but of the soul” (1993, 77). He believed that
Hungarianness, a Hungarian soul, could be cultivated through specific practices
originating with the folk. I aim here to use Györffy’s theory of collective memory
and plan for the reproduction of Hungarianness as a starting point for the exami-
nation of the táncház (dance house), a folk revival that emerged in Hungary in the
late socialist period the central practice of which is the mastering of the paradigm
of folk dance as social dance and its use in everyday life, what I term folk dance as
mother tongue. Doing so will not simply illuminate this case in Hungary, but also,
I argue, help us think through the historical tensions in the relationship of ethics
and politics and conceptualizations of the terms nép (folk) and népi (of the folk).
Indeed examining the relationship of nation-building and state formation in its
historical dynamism should be an important avenue for the study of nation-build-
ing everywhere. The important lens of state formation, what I take to be the pro-
cess of legitimation and the elaboration of social identities unfolding from the
institutionalization, definition of, and practice of citizenship, allows us to under-
stand the state as a ‘form of rule or ruling,’ thus focusing our attention on how rule
is accomplished through dynamic relationships rather than on a state that rules
(Corrigan 1994, xvii).4
DOES FOLK DANCING MAKE HUNGARIANS? 11
By exploring the ways in which the dance house revival represents the actual-
ization of Györffy’s program, I illustrate the weakness of his implicit assumption
that there is a timeless Hungarian soul that can be cultivated or a timeless folk that
can be its source. I will show how, while folk critiques rely on the folk, a concept
that like the German “volk” may be employed with class or ethnic connotations,
state formation processes in 20th century have contributed to a collective memory
that understands the folk in a primarily ethnic sense.
A note on definition is called for here. Györffy, populist writers and activists,
and the dance house itself are bound together in this paper by their attention to the
folk. Rather than calling them populist movements, the favored term of translation
for the népi movement of the interwar period (but a term never to my knowledge
applied to the dance house), I refer to these folk oriented projects as folk cri-
tiques.5 I suggest that these movements function to do two things. First, through
folk based critiques they reproduce and reify their object, the folk. Second, by en-
gaging in such a critique, participants construct themselves as Hungarian. Given
the folk’s age-old role as seed of the Nation, folk critiques unsurprisingly play an
important role in the production of a sense of the nation. Yet less acknowledged
has been their role in state formation. This paper thus notes a consistent preoccu-
pation with the nép (translated here as folk) and labeling of movements as népi (of
the folk), while their conceptualizations flux. In other words shifts in the meaning
of these terms, which reflects broader changes in citizenship regimes, are central
to this analysis.
In what follows I will explore the links and ruptures between folk critiques of
Györffy’s era and the dance house revival. I will establish Györffy’s project of
folk national cultivation as both a theory of collective memory and a plan for its
reproduction, embedding it within the literature on collective memory, before in-
troducing the dance house as an actualization of the plan. I will then qualify this
status by providing a historical contextualization of shifts in both conceptualiza-
tions of the relation of this ethical project of collective memory production and the
political sphere and of the very meaning of the term nép (the most immediately
available English translation of which is folk).
Collective Memory: History, Sense
Györffy tells us that while the use of writing allows us to pass intangible cus-
toms on to new generations, “if they do not remain in the memories of the living,
they will become lifeless traditions that no longer have the powerful life directing
force that living traditions or customs have” (1993, 7). In this sense, his definition
of collective memory is very similar to that of French sociologist Maurice
Halbwachs, who took pains to distinguish collective memory from historical
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memory and history as “the active past that forms our identities” (Olick and Rob-
bins 1998, 111). Both Györffy and Halbwachs conclude that collective memory
relies on material practices. Yet Halbwachs’ attention to historical change chal-
lenges Györffy’s assumption that a timeless and unique Hungarian soul can result
from this perpetuation of form.
Halbwachs proposed collective memory to be a dialectical process resulting
from the interaction of past and present. By applying interpretations influenced by
contemporary circumstances to institutionalized material practices, he argued,
groups produce a picture of the past (1992, 101). While such institutionalized
practices may go virtually unchanged over time, giving an appearance of unbro-
ken continuity, interpretations continue to change, renewing the contemporary
relevance of collective memory (1992, 117). Other thinkers have also contributed
to a nuanced understanding of the historical production of collective memory by
looking at how such institutionalized practices are connected to the senses.
Arguing that the “National thing” is an effect of belief, Slavoj Zizek furthers
that it is enjoyment, “materialized in a set of social practices and transmitted
through a set of national myths that structure these practices,” that provides its on-
tological consistency (1993, 202). Charles Hirschkind takes the relationship of
collective memory and the senses even further. Offering an approach to “the rela-
tion between sensory experiences and traditional practice” (2001, 628), he sug-
gests that practices of “ethical self-discipline” can serve to sediment emotions in
practitioners “in such a way to incline them toward moral action” (2001, 631). Ex-
amining the case of cassette sermon listeners in Egypt, Hirschkind asserts that the
link between listening and sense is not simply “established metaphorically, but
also through discipline, the training and inculcation of sensory habits,” including
bodily dispositions (2001, 628). Hirschkind’s intervention connects senses and
sensibility by examining how disciplinary practices may inform emotions and
judgments. He thus shares with Györffy the idea that the individual hones an ethi-
cal sensibility by engaging in practices institutionalized and given meaning to by
a group. Finally, providing a nuanced view of collective action, Alberto Melucci
(1988) argues that “frameworks of sense” underlie and inform social movements,
thus allowing us to perceive a relationship between the cultivation of ethical
dispositions and state formation. This relationship will be returned to later in the
paper.
Györffy and his contemporaries believed that the cultivation of Hungarianness
through folk practices would lead to empathy for the folk. In this view, such em-
pathy would affect social relations and consequently the social structure itself.
The dance house folk revival, which arose in the 1970s and is still active in Hun-
gary today, represents in many ways the actualization of Györffy’s program. At-
tention to this népi movement/folk critique that arose over three decades after the
publication of Györffy’s pamphlet illustrates the historical, political, and eco-
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nomic dimensions contributing to the production of collective memory.6 Indeed,
the very fact that dance house incorporates the use of folk practices in everyday
life and has a strong relationship to populist current helps to illustrate the weak-
ness of his assumption that there is a timeless Hungarian soul or a timeless folk
that can serve as its source. On the other hand, Györffy’s plan does prompt us to
consider how the production of a certain collective memory, or ethical cultivation,
through dance house practices can influence political outcomes, affecting access
to or definitions of citizenship. We witness in dance house a reproduction of a
sense of Hungarianness based on the reproduction of its source, the alleged folk.
Yet we also see that the folk has come to constitute something quite different than
the conception of it that took form in interwar Hungary. To understand how this
came about, we need to place Györffy’s program in historical context.
The Nép in the Interwar Period
Györffy is no forgotten ancestor. Indeed, his pamphlet was republished by the
István Györffy Ethnographic Association in 1993, while in 1991 ethnographer
Bertalan Andrásfalvy, Minister of Culture for the first democratically elected gov-
ernment of the postsocialist era (Magyar Demokrata Fórum, or Hungarian Demo-
cratic Forum), published a lecture entitled “István Györffy’s Program for the
Spread of Elements of Folk Cultivation Throughout Society.” Seeking to “trans-
late” Györffy’s use of the term “middle class” (középosztály) into “today’s
usage,” Andrásfalvy writes: “in 1939, one third of the population counted as mid-
dle class” (1991, 159). Stressing that the term should be understood in “the cul-
tural, not social sense,” he counts within that group those who had “outgrown folk
traditions” and made European culture their own through schooling and books.
Defined in opposition to the middle class, he writes, was that two thirds of the
population, the folk, that lived with folk traditions or was beginning to leave them
behind, but who did not take part in Europe’s common culture. These were mostly
peasants. Andrásfalvy’s insistence on the cultural sense of the term middle class at
the price of its social sense obscures important differences in Hungary’s social
constitution and political economic circumstances between 1939 and 1991.
Györffy and his populist associates used this same statistic to discriminate be-
tween these two classes of Hungarians. However, they did not stop at noting “cul-
tural differences,” recognizing in addition the limitations on citizenship experi-
enced by the folk.7 By 1928 Hungary had been dubbed “Három millió koldus
országa,” the land of three million paupers, in reference to the rapidly prole-
tarianizing stratum of manorial servants and their families, agrarian workers,
dwarf-holders, renters, and sharecroppers, who made up a third of the total popu-
lation and 67 percent of the peasant population (Borbándi 1989, 58).8 Secondary
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education was indeed a rare privilege for this group, for large landholders did not
encourage the schooling of their servants, believing that “knowledge and culture
will ruin them” (Borbándi 1989, 63). Landless and unrepresented in the political
sphere, this class carried the more privileged classes on its shoulders (Taylor
2008). Furthermore, in this period the term middle class was used to refer to the
officer and bureaucratic classes derived from the nobility, whose historical do-
main was the state apparatus (Borbándi 1989, 33, 48; Mócsy 1983).9 Indeed, the
governments of the Horthy era ruled with the conviction that only the “historical
classes” (the aristocracy, the middle nobility, the land-holding gentry, and the bu-
reaucratic, military officer, and intellectual layers that had developed from within
them) should participate in the political sphere, for it was these groups, which to-
gether comprised the middle class, that would assure the country would remain
Christian and National (Borbándi 1989, 37). Thus in a holdover from the feudal
usage of “nation,” meaning those with political rights, the term nation (nemzet)
was associated with a regime that protected the property interests of the Catholic
church and the aristocracy (Borbándi 1989).
In the period in which Györffy wrote, then, the terms middle class and folk
were not merely the cultural categories that Andrásfalvy stresses. They were de-
scriptions of social strata. This is why many people identifying themselves with
the cause of the folk did not stop at preserving, spreading, or validating its culture,
but also agitated for land reform and voting rights in its favor. Not all activities fo-
cused on the folk stressed social justice, however. Indeed, the Bouquet of Pearls
Movement and the boy scouts troupes that learned folk traditions and danced folk
dances (the so-called regõs scouts, who were influenced by the movement that
laid emphasis on “village visiting,” mentioned earlier) can hardly be considered
progressive. Yet in the Protestant folk high schools (népfõiskolák), the more
overtly political Peoples’ Colleges (Népi Kollégiumok), the 1932 March Front
mobilization, and the National Peasant Party social justice was a dominant
theme.10 In his book The Hungarian Populist Movement, Gyula Borbándi notes
that in the interwar period those actually labeled populist (népi) were not simply
interested in using or preserving elements of folk culture. The use of folkloristic
elements might have qualified a writer’s work as népies (folksy), Borbándi writes,
but such writers could not be considered népi (populist) because they “did not tie
[their] representations and images of the village to a demand for the transforma-
tion of society and held [themselves] distant from ‘radical political movements’”
(1989, 133).11
It might be difficult to secure Györffy’s role within the “népi movement,”
which itself remains a slippery category. While he appears in Borbándi’s book as
an important figure and his connections to the Peoples’ Colleges are well docu-
mented, he also had close ties with the far from radical Bouquet of Pearls folk
dance revival movement. Yet the fact that the exhibition he organized at the Insti-
DOES FOLK DANCING MAKE HUNGARIANS? 15
tute for Regional and Folk Research (Táj és Népkutató Intézet) highlighting the
oppression and poverty of the folk was shut down because it was an affront to the
government and the large landowners that supported it (Borbándi, 239–240)12
shows that he did not turn a blind eye to the social conditions of the folk.13
Divorced from the social and political platform pursued by populist activists,
attention to the folk could be found in the efforts of the interwar governments to
quiet, tame, or co-opt such critical forces to its “Christian national” program,
which favored rule by the so called “middle class,” made up of the military and
bureaucratic classes derived from the nobility. One example of this was The New
Spiritual Front policy pursued by Prime Minister Gyula Gömbös, designed to en-
list influential intellectuals concerned with the folk to the Christian National
cause. As the imminence of the permanent loss of much of the territory lost at
Trianon and the threat of German occupation became more possible with time,
these various approaches may have become less distinguishable, but there is no
doubt that occupation with the folk in the interwar period was born of the contin-
ued social and political oppression of the agrarian classes.14 Disembedded from
this historical context, Györffy’s program loses its connection to the interrelated
social and cultural definitions of the folk in the first half of the 20th century. Here
cultural validation was recognized as a cohort of social justice. Ethical cultivation,
the production of Hungarianness through the engagement in folk practices, was
thought to lead to empathy for the folk, the source of Hungarianness. This
empathy, in turn, was to lead to the transformation of society.
Ethical Cultivation, Politics, State Formation
While populist activists of the interwar period pursued land reform and the
franchise in tandem with cultural validation and the production of Hungarianness
through folk practices, it is important to point out that a tension did exist within
the movement concerning the proper sphere of action. Populist writers disagreed
amongst themselves over whether the movement should enter politics proper.
Seeing it as their responsibility to bring the spirit of the movement to “every social
and political frame,” many asserted that this should remain a spiritual/intellectual
movement (Borbándi 1989, 255–256). Populist writer Géza Féja concluded in his
article entitled The March Front that it should remain “a sociological and literary
movement guiding the world view, because in today’s politics things would only
become stagnant” (Féja, in Borbándi 1989, 257). For populists, then, opposition
was not simply a political matter. On the contrary, many opposed engaging in the
formal field of politics in what they saw as a corrupt regime, working primarily in
the spiritual sphere. Even when more overtly political manifestations arose, most
notably the March Front mobilization and the National Peasant Party, populist ac-
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tivists insisted that their work lay in the spiritual sphere. This conviction was only
confirmed by the compromised position in which the Peasant Party found itself
after the war, which I will consider later in this article.
Scholars have pointed out that conceptualizations of spheres of action are tied
with political and economic circumstances of state formation. Partha Chatterjee
(1986) suggests that anticolonial nationalism creates its own sphere of sover-
eignty within colonial society long before engaging in a political battle. This pro-
cess establishes an opposition between the “outer sphere,” the domain of statecraft
and formal politics, and the “inner sphere,” comprised of that which “marks cul-
tural identity.” Rather than seeing this dichotomy as unique to the colonial situa-
tion, we might see it as reflective of situations in which limitations on citizenship
prevail for certain classes of people under conditions of coercive political domi-
nance. Chatterjee’s description of the Bengali case is reminiscent of the German
context to which both Terry Eagleton and Norbert Elias point, the context in
which the idea of Kultur was posited as a response to that of civilization. Elias
suggests that this formulation resulted from the “long political impotence of the
German bourgeoisie combined with the late unification of the nation” (1978, 27).
He writes,
the watchwords expressing this self image of the German intellectual
class, terms such as Bildung and Kultur, tend to draw a sharp distinc-
tion ... between this purely spiritual sphere as the only one of genuine
value, and the political, economic and social sphere, in complete con-
trast to the watchwords of the rising bourgeoisie in France and
England (1978, 27).
As social conditions changed and characteristics of the bourgeoisie expanded
to become national characteristics, this distinction, which had begun as a class dis-
tinction, became a national distinction (Elias 1978, 31).
The political and social situation in interwar Hungary shares some qualities
with this case. While formal citizenship had been guaranteed since the 1840’s,
there were nevertheless practical limits to citizenship. The un-propertied agrarian
classes remained unrepresented in the political sphere, with only limited access to
education, progressive political parties were curtailed in their activities and intel-
lectual production was threatened with censorship (Taylor 2008). In places in
which “political dominance assumes… more openly coercive forms,” as in the
case of Germany in the 18th century (or, we might add, interwar or socialist Hun-
gary), the response might appear, writes Eagleton, as “aesthetic counter strategy –
a cultivation of instincts and pieties over which such power rides roughshod”
(Eagleton 1990, 27).
The more overtly political activities of the populist movement have been ob-
scured partly due to their strong orientation toward the spiritual sphere, but very
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likely also due to the role populist activists played in the transition to socialism.
With increasing censorship and the increasing difficulty of obtaining permits for
their activities, the movement was faced with the choice of founding a political
party or fading away. In 1939, with Germany now Hungary’s next door neighbor,
far right parties fared well in local elections (Borbándi 1989, 321). A circle of
populist writers and their agrarian supporters formed the National Peasant Party,
which, like the Communist Party, was illegal until 1945 (Borbándi 1989, 326).16
Not all populist writers agreed with the formation of the party, many argued that
no single party could represent the movement (Borbándi 1989, 325).
Part of the resistance (the Hungarian Front) during the war, The National Peas-
ant Party coalesced with the Communist Party, The Social Democratic Party, the
Civic Democratic Party, and the Smallholder’s Party in The Hungarian National
Independence Front, formed in 1944. While the overwhelming majority of votes
in the 1945 elections were for the Smallholder’s Party, the Communist Party was
able to play “a decisive role” through this coalition (Hanák 1991, 214). The Com-
munist Party further engaged in a series of purges and de-legitimations, aided by
its merging with the Social Democratic Party in 1948 (Hanák 1991, 216). Despite
having received only a small proportion of the votes, the National Peasant Party
secured the Ministry of Public Works (Péter Veres, later József Darvas), the Min-
istry of Defense (Veres), and the Ministry of Agriculture (Ferenc Erdei)
(Borbándi 1989, 445–447). While the Party would soon be dissolved along with
other parties, the fact that many populists had been left-leaning meant that a num-
ber of them still continued to occupy positions of influence during the Stalinist
era. Others suffered various levels of persecution.17 Most, however, found them-
selves in the myriad positions of cultural management occupied by intellectuals.
Beyond those few Peasant Party politicians who worked for the regime and the
brief reappearance of the party as the Petõfi Party in the months of the 1956 Revo-
lution (when the decision was made not to allow such “collaborators” a leading
role) (Borbándi 1989, 467), populist activists sought to continue their work in the
spiritual sphere. Indeed, the image of the populist movement resonant today por-
trays them as oppositional to and oppressed by the Communists. In any case,
while formal populist institutions were dispersed in 1948, populist influence lived
on under changing political and economic circumstances.
The Dance House Movement: Practicing Folk Dance as Mother Tongue
In the 1970s the dance house movement arose from the interaction of state so-
cialist cultural policy, the activities of populist cultural managers, global trends in
folk revival, and spontaneous youth movements (Martin 1981; Striker 1987,
1989; Halmos 1994, 2000; Ronstrom 1998; Taylor 2008). The emergence of the
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dance house revival was dependent on the convergence of the interest among
“beat” (rock and roll) musicians in village instrumental music and that of perform-
ing folk dancers and choreographers in moving beyond borrowing isolated motifs
to learning entire dances. Revivalists sought to become familiar with the internal
logic of dances embedded in the social environments of village dance events, or
dance houses. Modeled after dances, or balls, traditionally organized by adoles-
cents in the Transylvanian village of Szék (referred to as táncházak or dance
houses), the first Budapest dance house event was an attempt by the performing
folk dancers to transcend staged choreography and competition and engage in
Hungarian folk dance as social dance (Halmos 2000).
To be successful, however, these events required a live band able to play entire
suites and participants able to dance entire dances and dance suites. In order to
spread beyond the narrow layer of performing dancers and accompanying musi-
cians, the movement required institutionalized pedagogical technologies. The so-
lution was to provide dance instructors at each event to teach dance forms to new-
comers and help dancers acquire folk dance as a “mother tongue,” that is, to gain
such familiarity with the rules of the dance that individuals would be able to inno-
vate within their framework appropriately. Because the dance house was orga-
nized around teaching the entire dance suites of particular villages or regions, this
mastery of the folk dance as social dance and its use in everyday life also meant an
intimate knowledge of the traditions of particular places, the majority of them in
Transylvania. Much like “village visitors” (interwar ethnographers and enthusi-
asts of the folk who traveled to villages to familiarize themselves with “folk cul-
ture”), dance house goers visited Transylvanian villages in droves, hoping to gain
first hand knowledge and in the process making personal connections.
In its longevity, breadth of popular appeal, insistence on the systematic integ-
rity of folk dance and folk music as complex social and aesthetic forms, pedagogi-
cal emphasis on folk dance as mother tongue, and success at getting urban Hun-
garians to visit villages (especially in the territories lost), the dance house move-
ment appears as the realization of Györffy’s plan. By all means, through its tech-
nologies, this movement not only introduced folk practices to a broad spectrum of
Hungarian citizens who had not been exposed to them at home or in villages, but
also helped them integrate them into their everyday lives as a regular social activ-
ity.18 To have achieved Györffy’s goal, however, this engagement in folk prac-
tices must also have contributed to the Hungarianness of participants. How might
we evaluate its success on this front, when Györffy insists that external form is not
enough? Recall that, according to him, even a person with pure Magyar pedigree
does not have a “Hungarian soul” if all he does is “act like a Magyar” (ma-
gyarkodik) (160). Recall too that populist activists in the interwar period believed
that the adoption of folk practices would result in empathy for the folk, which in
turn could lead to social justice. Györffy and his fellow populist activists thus pur-
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sued two interrelated goals. They wanted to bring social justice to the folk by mak-
ing the entire nation more Hungarian through the adoption of folk practices and
the practice of “village visiting.” Finally, recall that the folk was not oppressed as
Hungarians per se, but as the lowest stratum in a feudal-like social structure. If we
accept that “Hungarianness” can be measured by sympathy for the folk, itself re-
flected in changes in the political sphere, then we must examine the consistent
conceptualization of the dance house as apolitical by its participants in relation to
the changes in the meaning of folk (nép) over time. While the terms drawn on to
define the movement have been attached to political projects in the past, for dance
house revivalists, “the people” have become “the ethnic folk.”
Unlike the many populist activists of the interwar period, while they too iden-
tify themselves as “népi” dance house goers as a group have never been comfort-
able with the idea that dance house is political. Furthermore, despite their own
tendencies to do so, dance house goers are apprehensive about the use of the term
movement to describe their activities. Noting its use by the socialist administra-
tion in reference to political movements instigated and maintained by the Party it-
self (such as the “workers movement” or the “youth movement”), they suggest
that the term represents a centralized and political initiative.
In interviews conducted during fieldwork in 2004, dance house goers and orga-
nizers stressed to me the non-ideological character of the movement. Arguing that
it is simply the love of folk dance and folk music that brings them together, partic-
ipants insist that there is no ideological thread that unites them. Despite this, many
expressed that dance house goers share an ethical worldview. Indeed, in inter-
views, dance house goers described dance house as a community; a “virtual com-
munity” that comes together at certain moments (like the Dance House Meeting);
a “virtual circle… which is not definable but rather a feeling – if a person says now
that they are, ‘I am a dance house goer (táncházas).’” The ideas that the dance
house had an oppositional quality under socialism and that it teaches people im-
portant values were frequently expressed. Such a situation suggests that we take a
nuanced approach to social movements, aided by our understanding of the histori-
cal production of collective memory.
Lamenting the conceptual fragility and overuse of the term “movement” in ex-
plaining the “social nature of collective action,” Alberto Melucci suggests that in
a number of social movements what collective actors have achieved is “to practice
‘alternative definitions of sense’” by creating “meanings and definitions of iden-
tity which contrast with the increasing determination of individual and collective
life by impersonal technocratic power” (Melucci 1988, 247). It is the networks
made of those who share such “frameworks of sense” that make mobilizations
possible, he argues, “rendering them visible in a punctual manner at moments
when confrontations with public policy emerge” (1988, 248). Yet, stressing quali-
ties quite different from those of the “rational actor” favored by many social
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movement theorists, Melucci writes, “within these networks there is an experi-
mentation with and direct practice of alternative frameworks of sense, in conse-
quence of a personal commitment which is submerged and almost invisible”
(1988, 248). While individuals engage in dance house activities for myriad rea-
sons, they are bound together by a framework of sense produced, I argue, through
the practices of dance, etiquette, sociable conversation, and village tourism: in the
associative space of dance house events.
This framework of sense produced in the associative space of dance house
events may congeal, I argue, into a fragile and contradictory “community of
sense” in moments of collective action beyond participation in the social event.19
It is thus that this shared framework of sense extends to the ways in which people
act outside of the dance house setting. I find evidence that dance house partici-
pants, united by activities and practices promoting the perpetuation of ‘folk tradi-
tion’ in everyday life, share ideas about nation and citizenship on which they act
in their private and public lives. While dance house goers do not agree on every-
thing, it is clear that the associative events of dance house are socializing events, a
characteristic that most dance house goers would acknowledge of the “original”
village dance house on which revivalist events are modeled.
Submerged Senses, Sensibilities
How do we get, however, from a shared framework of sense to something like a
political sensibility? Recall that Halbwachs argued that collective memory is pro-
duced through the interaction of institutionally preserved practices and meaning
ascribed to them, influenced by contemporary circumstances, including available
ideologies and political economic conditions. In the 1940s Györffy’s students
László E. Kovács, and Gyula Ortutay suggested that Györffy’s “nemzetnevelõ”
(nation cultivating) prescription should be followed and vowed to take on this re-
sponsibility (Balassa 1993).20 But from the 1950s on it was cultural managers
more than academic ethnographers who pursued the work of népi (people’s, folk)
cultivation. In his assessment of the application of Györffy’s ideas, Bertalan
Andrásfalvy points out that the Népmûvelési Intézet (Institute for People’s Cul-
ture) sponsored the so-called hagyományõrzõ (tradition-keeping) dance ensem-
bles in the villages.
Founded as the Népi Mûvelõdési Intézet (Institute for Folk Culture) in 1946 by
populist (népi) writers Gyula Illyés and László Németh, with the support of the
Szabadmûvelõdési Tanács (Council for Free Cultural Cultivation), this Institute
was funded by the Socialist state from 1950 onwards (Taylor 2008). Its direction
was strongly effected by populist (népi) employees and directors, including
Elemér Muharay, György Martin, and Iván Vitányi, who continued to have a
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strong influence. The Institute did much more than support the village tradi-
tion-keeping ensembles, however. It was the main resource center for performing
folk dancers, and the home to the Magyar Állami Népi Együttes (Hungarian State
Folkdance Ensemble). Furthermore, folk dance and folk music collections were
made by its employees and housed in its archives. Beyond this, a main task of the
Institute was to guide associative life and to provide resources for cultivating in-
stitutions (such as the network of culture houses) and associative activities (usu-
ally held within them) (Taylor 2008).21
It is no coincidence that the Institute lent strong support to the infant dance
house revival. In fact some call long time employee and folk dance scholar
György Martin the “father of the dance house” because he introduced key musi-
cians and dancers to one another and encouraged them to revive the village social
dance environment. At the institute, Iván Vitányi, a populist (népi) since his
youth, produced literature on the dance house as a realization of populist goals
(1972). He became director of the Institute in 1973, and by 1976 plans had been
made for a “dance house leader” course modeled on the “club leader” courses
taught in previous years to facilitate club activities in the culture houses (Taylor
2008). His language was tempered by the socialist milieu, but was not at odds with
his commitment to social democracy. He claimed that the formation of communi-
ties was at the heart of folk art.
”At the beginning,” said Ferenc Sebõ, musician and key actor in the emergence
of the dance house in a 1976 interview, “we were immediately preoccupied with
what folk art is about; that it creates community and spreads the basis of cultured
recreation (szórakozás) and awakens the demand for more and better too” (Sebõ,
1977, 5). Like folk, community is a malleable term. While youth at that time ex-
pressed the desire to counter what they saw as the alienation of socialist culture, as
long as the community form was borrowed from “the folk” it was unclear whether
such a community could be created or only continued. While he defended the
dance house revival against charges of nationalism, in Vitányi’s view, folk dance
as a community-forming activity relies on the fact that it is practiced by a commu-
nity. The folk was taken, unproblematized, as that community.
Personal accounts of dance house goers show that their varied and idiosyn-
cratic ideas about dance house are influenced both by historical and contemporary
discourses. Many use the ideas of the populist movement and Györffy without re-
ferring to them, especially when speaking of its apolitical but cultivating role,
while some point explicitly to interwar populist activists. Influential choreogra-
pher and key figure in the first Budapest dance house events, Sándor Tímár, for
example, cites Györffy in his 1999 book In the Language of Folk Dance, in which
he links Györffy’s program with “the right to speak one’s mother tongue,” a right
he believes should be extended to dances (Tímár 1999, 7). Dance house goers
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very rarely acknowledged to me, however, the broader political project that popu-
list activists pursued in the interwar era, emphasizing instead the apolitical ethical
role that those labeled népi were known for in both the interwar and socialist eras.
Despite the breadth of interpretations of what dance house is or does, most dance
house goers at one point or another associate dance house with some kind of ethi-
cal outcome.
Hungarian Soul?
Now we must return again to the question at hand. If collective memory, spe-
cifically, a “Hungarian soul”, can be produced and reproduced through the incor-
poration of folk practices into everyday life, how might we evaluate its content?
The goal of those who espoused “népi nemzeti mûvelõdés” (folk national cultiva-
tion) was to produce a framework of sense through cultural innovation, the pro-
duction of models of behavior and social relationships that enter into everyday life
(Melucci 1988, 247). Yet Melucci further argues that it is the networks made of
those who share such “frameworks of sense” that make mobilizations possible,
“rendering them visible in a punctual manner at moments when confrontations
with public policy emerge” (1988, 248). Györffy and népi activists hoped to culti-
vate in Hungarian citizens a sympathy for the folk and its practices not simply to
create a community in itself, but because they hoped the creation of this commu-
nity of sense would result in a transformation of the social system. We know that
in dance house a preservation of folk form is achieved, but what about respect or
empathy for the folk? What about social justice? What about the transformation of
society?
If we take the folk to be best represented by Hungarian minority villagers in
Transylvania, as many dance house revivalists do, then we might take as evidence
the fact that most of those with whom I spoke asserted their responsibility to vote
yes on a 2005 referendum calling for Hungarian citizenship rights for ethnic Hun-
garians in the neighboring countries, most of whom live in Transylvania. While
the referendum was nullified by low turnout, dance house goers’ expression of re-
sponsibility toward Hungarians living outside of Hungary may have translated
into a significant proportion of the 51.5% of the population that went to the polls
(35% ) who voted yes. Indeed we might witness here a framework of sense mani-
festing as a mobilization. But if we recognize this “Hungarian soul” thus, then we
are tempted also to examine the contemporary meanings of the word folk and their
relationship to political and economic circumstances.
Györffy wrote in a period characterized by the cataclysmic loss of two-thirds of
Hungarian territory to the neighboring countries. While the loss of this territory
made the polity more homogeneous that it had been before, it also had two other
consequences that are important in this context. The first was discrimination faced
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by ethnic Hungarians under their new governments. The second was a demo-
graphic change on a massive scale caused by the change of borders and the resul-
tant influx of refugees to Hungary. This influx of mostly middle class landowning
Hungarians meant that those who remained beyond the borders were those who
could not afford to leave, in other words those who comprised the folk. In Hun-
gary the continued feudal-like structure of political and social life pursued by the
Christian National government, in which displaced nobility cum middle class
were overrepresented, was justified by the need to support these “immigrants.”
The size of the state apparatus, the historical role of which had been to employ the
nobility, remained the same in a polity reduced to a third of its former size (Mócsy
1983, 185–186; Taylor 2006). Yet the loss of the territories was considered unfair
by all, and both the government and populist activists were concerned with
reproducing Hungarianness in Transylvania.
In the Socialist period that followed Communists attempted to co-opt the term
folk to mean “the working classes” or “the people.”22 While the Hungarian word
nép, like the German term Volk, had class connotations, it was strongly associated
with the agrarian masses, and Communists were not able to wrest the term from its
romantic and ethnic sense. With political engagement forbidden and social citi-
zenship guaranteed, if differentially, the populist focus on social justice shifted to-
ward those ethnic Hungarians oppressed in Transylvania. Why was this the case?
First, processes of uneven development (collectivization included) guaranteed
that agriculture was modernized more slowly in Transylvania than in Hungary.
This meant that isolated Transylvanian villages retained “traditional” features,
while Hungarian villages experienced rapid change. Second, ethnic Hungarians in
Romania were subject to oppression, especially under the fiercely assimilationist
policies of the Ceaupescu regime beginning in 1965 (Brubaker et al. 2006; Chen
2003). Third, beginning in that same period, Hungary “enjoyed” a kind of cultural
thaw resulting from the legitimation policies of János Kádár, who came to power
after the 1956 Revolution. In the later years of Socialism the Hungarian govern-
ment allowed expressions of solidarity, culminating in massive protests in 1988,
with Transylvanians as a kind of escape valve (or legitimation device) in the place
of domestic issues (New York Times 1988; see also Kürti 2001). Finally, as
Slavoj Zizek (1993) notes, conceptions of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft were
united under the oppositional or “ethical civil society” (Renwick 2006) of the so-
cialist period, when occupation with the folk helped to establish Communism as
foreign, simultaneously strengthening the idea of the nation, and the ethnicifi-
cation of the folk.
Using a lens of state formation and a nuanced approach to social movements,
I have illuminated the continuities and ruptures between Györffy’s plan for folk
national cultivation and the dance house movement that arose over 30 years later,
and contextualized the meanings that the concept of folk inhabits at different his-
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torical conjunctures. Dance house represents the realization of Györffy and his
contemporaries’ plan to introduce folk practices into the everyday lives of Hun-
garian citizens and confirms their idea that such activities can lead to empathy and
consequent political effects. Yet, while Györffy’s theory also assumes that the
content of Hungarianness is derived from contact with a timeless folk, we have
seen that the folk with which dance house revivalists are occupied is conceived
quite differently from that about which Györffy wrote. Dance house practices
reify “the folk” even while affording it a meaning reflecting contemporary politi-
cal and economic conditions. Indeed, the agricultural population in Hungary is of
little concern to revivalists. Finally, while populist (népi) activists pursued politi-
cal goals in tandem with populist “cultivation,” the refusal of ideology that char-
acterizes dance house goers does not allow them to recognize political upshots.
This commitment to the purity of the spiritual sphere serves to obscure connec-
tions with the political sphere. Nevertheless, in this examination we have seen that
ethical cultivation may indeed be a powerful element in the process of state forma-
tion. Therefore, we must take seriously Györffy’s idea that the practice of folk
forms, combined with a will to be Hungarian, will produce something – a particu-
lar collective memory about Hungarianness – and may lead to social change. De-
spite a lack of belief in the relationship between ethics and politics among contem-
porary dance house goers, these individualized practices of what Charles
Hirschkind calls ethical self-discipline can cultivate frameworks of sense.
Whether these frameworks of sense are evidence of “Hungarianness” is another
question.
Notes
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the April 2008 symposium at Indiana Univer-
sity entitled the Hungarian Folk Music Revival and Dance House Movement. I would like to
thank Ágnes Fülemile for inviting me to give this paper at the symposium and László Felföldi,
László Kelemen, and Carol Silverman for comments on the presentation. I am indebted to
Banu Karaca and Csilla Kalocsai for their close readings of and commentary on the manu-
script.
1 The term nép is analogous with the German term Volk, and therefore reflects the same tensions
between class and ethnic usages. The English term folk has lost its class and ethnic sense, re-
taining only the agricultural meaning. Reflecting these tensions and the breadth with which the
term nép has been employed, translation into English can be problematic. In this paper I will at
times use the term nép and its adjectival form, népi to illustrate both continuities and disconti-
nuities in conceptualizations and uses of the terms.
2 Herder made specific reference to Hungary in Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der
Menschheit, in which he prophesized that, surrounded by a sea of Slavic and Germanic peo-
ples, the Hungarian language, and thus the Hungarian nationality itself, was destined to disap-
pear.
DOES FOLK DANCING MAKE HUNGARIANS? 25
3 While based on the literary debates between the two groups, many define “populists,” cultural
and political advocates for the folk, as having been in opposition with urbanists, who repre-
sented an urbanite worldview and advocated its place in Hungarian society (and quite often es-
poused social democratic political views), it is important to note that in the interwar period
both groups stood in opposition to the Christian National Government’s feudal ideology of
limited citizenship.
4 I am indebted to Corrigan and Sayer, Philip Abrams, and Charles Tilly for this vision of state
formation, civil society and social movements.
5 The fact that Borbándi’s book translates as “The Hungarian Populist Movement” reflects the
prevalence of agrarian “populist” movements in East Central Europe in the 19th and 20th cen-
turies. This is interesting, as dance house participants quite freely refer to themselves as népi,
the term that translates to populist in the interwar period, and prompts us to examine the histor-
ical dimensions of the word. See Held 1996 and Pirie 1997 for discussions of East Central Eu-
ropean populisms.
6 Please see page 12, paragraph 2 revivalists refer to themselves as népi, but would not be happy
with populist as a translation for their behaviors or stances. This reflects the tension bwteen un-
derstanding the term “népi mozgalom” as populist movement or folk movement.
7 In his now often quoted text, T. H. Marshall disaggregated citizenship into three elements: the
political, civil and social. He defines political rights as the “right to participate in the exercise
of political power as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the
members of such a body,” civil rights as those “necessary for individual freedom-liberty of
person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid
contracts, and the right to justice [that is] the right to defend and assert all one’s rights on terms
of equality with others and by due process of law”, and political rights as “the right to partici-
pate in the exercise of political power as a member of the body invested with political authority
or as an elector of the members of such a body”. He defines social rights as “the right to a modi-
cum of economic welfare and security [and the] right to share to the full in the social heritage
and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in society.” (T. H.
Marshall, quoted in Seligman 1992, 113–114). This aggregate approach to citizenship allows
us to view citizenship, and thus, state formation dynamically.
8 Journalist György Oláh published a book entitled Három millió koldus in 1928. The term was
adopted in public debate and literature to refer to the poorest stratum of peasant society
(Borbándi 1989, 58; Vitányi, personal communication).
9 The term polgár (derived from Burgher) was used to refer to the bourgeoisie and often used as
a gloss for Jew (Borbándi 1989, 33, 48; Mócsy 1983).
10 For a detailed discussion of the interrelations and differences between these activities, see
Taylor 2008 and Borbándi 1989.
11 Borbándi insists that style alone was not enough to make one populist or urbanist (Borbándi
1989, 195).
12 It was Györffy’s good friend Pál Teleki, Minister of Culture at the time, who made it possible
for the Institute to open, but who also berated the researchers for what he saw as bad science
and an affront to his class (Borbándi, 239–240).
13 Even Andrásfalvy (1991, 161) points this out after he insists on the cultural meaning of middle
class.
14 We can find folk writers adopting anything along the spectrum of far right to far left stances in
this period, while still usually not supporting the Christian National view. Populist activists,
however, did work within government institutions, where they believed they could influence
the direction of events.
15 Féja was one of the organizers of the March Front and a NÉKOSZ activist.
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16 The main founders of the party were Imre Kovács, Pál Szabó, Ferenc Erdei, Ferenc Farkas,
Péter Veres (Borbándi 1989, 323–326).
17 István Deák challenges the popular view of the Populist Writers as oppressed by the Commu-
nists. He argues that they were actually favored by the Party leadership. Because they were not
Jews, they were seen as “likely to serve as a bridge between the Party leadership and the peo-
ple” (Deák 1999, 56).
18 Dance house events are held daily in Budapest. They are held several times a week in provin-
cial cities and towns, and hardly at all in rural areas of Hungary. Dance house “folkdance as
mother tongue” techniques have become standard training for performing folkdancers, who
may or may not attend dance house events.
19 Melucci (1988) used the phrases framework of sense and community of sense interchange-
ably. In this work I use framework of sense to represent the common set of senses and sensibil-
ities discussed in this chapter, while I reserve “community of sense” for those moments in
which this network of dance house goers can be seen to congeal into a community in relation to
the formal political process.
20 See Hofer (1980) for a discussion of the role played by the discipline of ethnography in East
European nation building.
21 It was called Népmûvészeti Intézet (Institute for Folk Art) from 1951–1957, Népmûvelõdési
Intézet (Institute for People’s Culture) from 1957–1986, Országos Közmûvelõdési Központ
(National Center for Public Cultivation) until 1992, and the Hungarian Institute for Culture
since then. In 2001 an independent Institution (also state funded) emerged from the depart-
ments dealing with folk art. This Institution, Heritage House, continues to share a building
with the Institute.
22 There was some precedent for this, as the Social Democratic party had long used the term nép
to represent “the people.”
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